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Introduction and Stunmary
The symposium "Agricultural and Water Quality Improvements; What
are the Implementation Costs and Policy Issues?" was organized to
establish what is known and to identify additional research needs.
The major impetus for action on agricultural nonpoint source pollution
problems comes from Section 208 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Amendments of 1972 and the Rural Clean Water Program. Public programs
involving large expenditures from both public and private sources are
being implemented and require economic research and analysis.
The objectives of the symposium are;
1. To present and examine some current research results addressing
water quality and agricultural nonpoint pollution control
activities, and
2. To identify issues needing further inquiry research.
Papers are presented representing viewpoints from different regions
of the country, the East, the Midwest, and the Northeast. Each author
had 10-15 minutes to present his thoughts, followed by an opportunity
for reaction and discussion by the audience. The participants on the
symposium panel were Lee A. Christensen, chairman (ESS, University of
Georgia), George Casler (Cornell University), Edward Michalson and-
David Walker (University of Idaho), John Miranowski (Iowa State
University), Klaus Alt (ESS, Iowa State University), Lawrence W. Libby
(Michigan State University), and Ivery Clifton (University of Georgia).
This symposium addresses costs and policy issues related to
^lt®^^stives for agricultural nonpoint source pollution control and water
il
quality improvement. Discussants highlighted research results, but
focused on information needs.
George Casler raises questions about the appropriateness of the
term "best management practices" and whether the water quality problems
addressed are properly defined. Is too much attention being focused on
erosion control as a surrogate for water quality improvement? More
evidence is needed to identify the long-run benefits to farmers from
erosion control and to show the relationship between reduced erosion
on farmland and the reduction in nutrients, pesticides and sediment
deposited in lakes and reservoirs. Other information needs include the
long-run effect of erosion control and tillage practices on yields, the
effectiveness of alternative tillage practices in reducing soil loss,
and the measurement of benefits of increased water quality.
Casler also calls for a better understanding of the universal soil
loss equation (USLE). Economists often use the USLE as the basis for
analysis but seldom have economists tried to fit a production function
to the data base used to develop the equation. Since this equation is
used in so many economic studies of erosion control, in-depth analytical
work on its underlying structure needs to be carried out.
Ed Michalson reports on two studies in the Palouse area of
Washington and Idaho, analyzing the impl^entation costs of some best
management practices. A study in Whitman and Latah counties evaluates
the opportunity costs of controlling soil erosion in the area. Using a
linear programming model and the modified universal soil loss equation,
the impact of changing crop rotations and minimum tillage for reducing
soil erosion is analyzed. The results indicate that it is possible to
iii
reduce soil losses to four tons an acre by going to more extensive'
cropping systems. The cost of this soil loss reduction is $30 an acre.
A second study in the Latah county soil and water conservation
district evaluated a program containing restricted summer fallon,
minimum tillage, contour tillage, divided slopes, and seeding in
critical areas. Application of this program results in an' opportunity
cost of approximately $11 an acre, and reduces soil losses to approxi
mately two and one half tons per acre.
A.comparison of the two studies clearly indicates that if one can
rely on the modified universal soil loss equation, the five practices
undertaken in the second study are much more effective than merely
manipulating crop rotations and relying on minimum tillage.
David Walker discusses studies in Iowa which examined how to
encourage farmer adoption of best management practices. While society'
gains much of the benefits from enhanced water qualities, farmers pay
most of both direct and indirect" costs of erosion and sediment control.
This disproportionate sharing of costs discourages farmer adoption of
BMP' s.
A study in Iowa simulates the impact of alternative public policies
on BMP adoption, net farm income, water quality, and soil losses in the
Nishnabotna River Basin. The policies analyzed include subsidies,
regulations and soil loss.taxes. The BMP*s evaluated are contouring,
minimum tillage, spring plowing to maintain surface crop residue,
1 ,
terracing, and changing crop mix. A linear programming' model is used
which incorporates three price scenarios: high crop prices relative
to input costs, low crop prices, and average or trend crop prices.
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Results indicate that soil loss and agricultural sedimentation of surface
waters could be reduced as much as 90 percent with income penalties of
less than 14 percent. The achievement of this standard could be realized
with regulatory policies, subsidies, or tax policies. However, subsidies
alone are not likely to achieve water quality improvements, but need
supplementing with regulatory policies or taxes. Further research is
needed on the couqjatibility between conservation goals and water quality
goals.
The paper by Alt and Miranowski addresses the selection of criteria
for deciding the appropriate policy instruments for controlling nonpoint
pollution. Another question addressed is how do policy costs influence
the choice of policy instruments and level of pollution control. The
major economic criteria considered in policy analysis are efficiency
and equity. Generally the literature treats user charges, subsidies,
and marketable rights as being equally efficient alternatives and more
efficient than most direct regulation approaches.
Greater attention needs to be given policy costs, including the
costs of information, administration and enforcement, when establishing
the optimum level of pollution abatement and selecting policy instruments.
Policy costs, error costs, and social costs of inefficient programs must
be dealt with simultaneously. The equity questions remain unanswered
and will influence the acceptability of policy instruments.
Larry Libby's paper focuses on the policy structure for implementing
water quality programs affecting agriculture. He asserts that Institutional
structure does make a difference both in terms of policy output and distri
bution of implementation costs. Afundamental role for economists in the
implementation'of water quality policy is the-organization and measure
ment of the implications of,alternative institutional arrangements.
Allocation of discretion among the key actors—landowners and managers,
levels of government, and agencies within a level of government—can
affect performance and overall costs.
Water quality problems can be solved only through the cooperation
and interactions of all levels of government. Federal, state, and local
entities must recognize their strengths and limitations in dealing with
water pollution. Some interests would like to see the federal level
disappear, while others see no hope for local implementation. The fact
is that both must work together to solve problems. The involvement of
federal government comes from legislation and other indicators of
popular support. Local governments retain authority for traditional
land use regulations. Any change in the relative political power of
these varying government entities must recognize the political support
that has built up over the years. Adjustments in allocation of discre
tion among levels of government must acknowledge significant strengths
that these levels have established over time. It would be a costly -
mistake to assume that only through the drastic reordering of roles
could water quality improvement be accomplished.
Libby discusses the importance of the political process in meeting
water quality goals. Legislative programs such as RCWP and RCA seek to
improve water quality by changing the ways people use resources. This
is accomplished through the positive and negative incentives provided
through the institutional structure. EPA approaches the problem from a
regulatory perspective whereas USDA focuses on voluntary programs.
VI
Policy options need to consider the administrative costs of other than
voluntary compliance programs. The economics of water quality
improvemei^ need to measure the cost differences of alternative
institutional structures for ijnproving water quality. More information
is needed on the overall economic performance of various practices.
BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES:
ECONOMIC ISSUES AND WATER QUALITY IMPLICATIONS
George L. Casler
I am interested in solving or at least alleviating the problems
of non-point water pollution from agricultural production. It will
take a combination of economics, politics, bureaucracy, and physical
and biologicaT information to accomplish the jobi Many of our rather
elegant economic ideas and models are not likely to have great impact
on the actions that are taken to reduce non-point pollution. Perhaps
the best that economists can do is to help ensure that large amounts
of money are not spent on programs that do little or nothing to alle
viate agricultural sources of non-point pollution.
My comments are limited to non-irrigated agriculture east of the
100th meridian which runs about'through Lincoln, Nebraska. You can
judge whether they have any relevance to irrigated agriculture or to
non-irrigated agriculture west of the 100th meridian^
I have several concerns about the efforts of. the United States to
deal with non-point pollution from agriculture:
1. Are the water quality problems well defined?
2. Do we know how to correct them?
3. Or are we really just working on erosion control?
This paper is a somewhat modified version of remarks made at a sym
posium on Agriculture and Water Quality Improvement: What are the
Implementation Costs and Policy Issues? at the AAEA meeting in Pullman,
Washington, July 29-August 1, 1979, At the time this paper was completed,
the author was a visiting professor of economics at Colorado State
University.
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I believe that it is time for a mid-course or perhaps a mid-stream
correction in what we are doing. You may believe that it is rather late
in the game for a major mid-stream correction since we are finally to
the point where the EPA is in gear with 208 planning, most states have pre
pared non-point control plans> and Congress is close to appropriating
cost-sharing money, although they didn't quite make it last year.
ECONOMIC ISSUES
My v/ork in the area of non-point pollution from agriculture goes
back about 10 years. My first paper on the subject was presented at the
NAEC meeting in Amherst, Massachusetts, in 1959. Most of n^y work in the
area has been part of interdisciplinary projects with agronomists, engineers,
aquatic biologists, and sociologists. You will find that I talk as much
about the physical and biological issues as I do about economic issues.
I am going to paint with a rather broad brush.
Let me summarize some of what I believe we know and don't know,
starting with the cost-effectiveness of BMP's. First, I believe we should
throw out or alter the phrase "best management practices". It implies
that someone, somewhere, knov/s what is the best practice to control non-
point pollution. In most situations that is probably not true. In one
recent session (perhaps a review team for one of our research projects)
we decided to change BMP's to AMP's. I don't remember whether it meant
"alternative" pr "acceptable" management practices but it seems to me that
the latter would be more descriptive and useful than "best".
Soil Erosion and Sedimentation
A number of studies, one of the first by Jacobs around 10 years ago,
seem to have established that reduced tillage, either conservation tillage
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or no-tils are cost effective for erosion control on many crops and soils.
In cases where adverse yield effects are nil or small, the cost reductions
for reduced tillage result in improved farm Incomes. Therefore, it should
be relatively easy to induce farmers to adopt such practices, r also
.understand that on a number of soils and crops reduced tillage methods
are unsatisfactory. In particular, conservation tillage or no-til are not
acceptable practices on cotton. These practices do not work well on some
of the heavier, wetter, and colder soils used to grow corn and soybeans.
Chisel plowing has been rapidly adopted in many corn and soybean areas,
although there is some question of whether the result really, qualifies
as conservation tillage.
On many of the steeper slopes, reduced tillage is not sufficient to
reduce erosion to "acceptable" levels. ..Either structural practices such
as terraces or rotations with more hay are needed. In most cases, these
practices will reduce net farm incomes, at least in the short run. It
will be difficult to get farmers to adopt such practices without substantial
cost-sharing or strict enforcement of regulations.
One ,of my great concerns is that the profitability of erosion control
measures and of structural practices in particular depends on both the short
and long run yield effects of the practices. I believe that our knowledge
of these yield effects is woefully inadequate. It was pointed out in an
earlier session today that someone in the USDA has come up with long run
yield effects of soil conservation practices for a number of crops in some
thing like 22 watersheds. He must either be more diligent than I in searching
the.1iterature or more creative in crunching numbers to have anything on
which to base those yield effects. Nevertheless, the yield effects of
soil conservation need to be established in order to convince farmers
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of the benefits to themselves from erosion control.
Nutrients and Pesticides
The real issues with respect to nutrients and pesticides are in the
physical and water quality areas. Therefore, I am not going to make any
statements at this point about the cost-effectiveness of BMP's for the
control of such substances..
HATER QUALITY IMPLICATIONS
The most recent research projects in which I have been involved are^
interdisciplinary primarily with soil and water and systems analysis
people in agricultural engineering. They have been v/orking on physical
models to try to get a handle on what happens to substances other than
sediment that might have water quality impacts. We have not really pushed
the analysis as far as the water quality impacts but are tying to under
stand the movement of nutrients and perhaps pesticides at the field level.
Sediment
Before I discuss that, I want to make some comments about sediment.
Assuming that the universal soil loss equation (USLE) gives reasonably
correct results, and there is some question about that, we know quite a
bit about controlling erosion. There is a tendency to believe that reduced
erosion on farmland leads to a proportional reduction in sediment carried
by streams and rivers and sediment deposited in lakes and reservoirs. I
would like to raise the question, "Where is the evidence?" I really have
not seen it and don't believe it exists. First of all, we have the matter
of delivery ratios. I think we do know that delivery ratios vary by dis
tance from the stream and probably by elevation above the stream. Much
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of the eroded soil is redeposited before it reaches the stream. A
substantial portion'of this redeposition is within the field where the
original erosion occurred. I have not seen a watershed model that oper
ational izes this concept. Also, do delivery ratios., change as erosion
is reduced? And in which direction? In addition, particle size and en
richment ratios for some nutrients such as phosphorus appear to be a
function of amount of erosion, but the quantitative relationships are not
well defined. The implications of this for water quality will be dis
cussed later. Another.problem, of course, is stream bank erosion and the
sediment carrying capacity of streams. Some hydrologists believe that in
many watersheds, reduction in soil erosion on the land will actually have
little impact on the amount of sediment carried by the stream. In total,
I believe that we will be forced to find much of the benefit from erosion
control somewhere other than in the stream whfch drains the farmland.
Nutrients
There is a tendency to believe that reducing erosion will solve or
at least markedly reduce the problem of excess nutrients in surface water.
This may not be true and probably is not true particularly for the impor
tant forms of nitrogen and phosphorus. Nitrate nitrogen, the form of
nitrogen most people are concerned about, is more likely to be related to
cropping patterns and levels of nitrogen fertilization than to soil erosion,
Erosion control is not likely to reduce the problem of nitrate nitrogen
levels in water unless erosion control is accomplished by substituting
crops which use little nitrogen fertilizer.
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In the case of phosphorus, there is substantial controversy over
whether soluble or total phosphorus is the important substance to be
controlled. One of the groups that I worked with several years ago quite
clearly established that soluble phosphorus, not total phosphorus, is the
key to controlling excessive growth of algae [Porter, 1975]. However,
It seems quite clear that those who agree with us are in the minority.
Host people who claim to be knowledgeable about the situation appear to
believe that control of total phosphorus will effectively control excessive
algae growth and that erosion control will control a major portion of the
phosphorus'in question. I believe that erosion control will be quite
effective in controlling total phosphorus although if the phosphorus
enrichment ratio varies inversely with the quantity of eroded soil, the
control of total phosphorus will not be proportional to erosion control.
It is quite possible that some erosion control practices, such as no-til,
which leaves much residue on the surface will lead to Increases rather
than decreases in soluble phosphorus runoff [Colette]. Erosion control
i'n general may not control soluble phosphorus very well. If soluble
phosphorus control is a major key to Improved water quality, t am afraid
that erosion control will give disappointing results.
Pestlctdes
Erosion control is not likely to solve many water quality problems
related to pesticides. While erosion control will reduce the amounts of
pesticides strongly adsorbed to soil that get into surface waters, the
key to pesticide problems of water quality is likely to be something else,
such as changes in types of pesticides or biological controls.
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Modeling Results
Before I show you some data from nutrient modeling efforts at Cornell
I would like to make this statement: Despite literally millions of dollars
spent by EPA and other organizations on efforts to model or measure nutrient
and pesticide runoff and inputs to surface and ground water, we still don't
know much about it. I believe that some of the modeling efforts were a
waste of money and that could have been known before the work was done.
But the real problem is that the processes involved are complex and not
easily measured or modelled. The available data base is probably still
much smaller than that used to develop the USLE.
The data I will present results from the Cornell Nutrient Simulation
(CNS) model [Haith and Loehr] developed by agricultural engineers at
Cornell, Table 1 shows some estimates of changes in dissolved nutrient
losses resulting from the application of several alternative soil conserva
tion practices to one soil and cropping situation in Iowa. You should
focus on the changes in nutrient losses relative to the changes in soil
losses. In all cases the losses are "edge of field" losses and do not
consider delivery ratios.
The major point to be made from the data in this table is that, except
for the corn-alfalfa rotation, the application of soil conservation practices
to continuous corn results in much smaller reductions in runoff losses of
disolved nitrogen and phosphorus than the reductions in soil losses.
Except for the corn-alfalfa rotation, the conservation practices increased
the amount of leached nitrogen and the total amount of dissolved nitrogen
leaving the field did not change. The major reason that the impact of ero
sion control measures is much less on dissolved nutrient runoff than on
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soil losses is that the impact on runoff of water is much less than the
impact on soil erosion. Those who believe that control of dissolved
nutrients rather than control of total nutrients is a major key to im
proved water quality are likely to question whether erosion control will
cure our water quality problems.
I must admit that I don't have a great deal of faith in the CNS model.
Tests of it against measured plot data have given less than spectacular
results. However, I have not see.i other workable nutrient models that do
as well. The developers of the model have stated that it is as good as
the USLE. At this point, I cannot resist a comment about the USLE. Many
economists, including me, have used the USLE as part of our economic models.
Yet I doubt that any of us have intensively studied the development of the
equation. If any of us had submitted an article to the AJAE describing
the development of the USLE as a production function, the reviewers would
probably have laughed us off the pages. I believe that the factors used for
some of the conservation practices are particularly weak. It is rather
sobering to think of the numerous economic studies of pollution control
that are largely based on the USLE and that probably no economist has ever
tried to fit a production function (with soil loss as the dependent vari
able) to the data base used to develop the equation. I believe it would
be useful for an economist to fit such a production function. Perhaps
it would be useful for us to expend perhaps 5 percent of the effort that the
profession has expended on fertilizer production functions to estimate an
erosion function.
CRITICAL NEEDS
I would like to sum up with what I believe are some of the critical,
research needs in terms of solving or alleviating the non-point pollution
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problems of agriculture.
We need better data on the long-run impact of erosion control on
crop yields, I have pointed out to many people that erosion does not appear
to be the overriding factor in yields. For example, U.S. corn yields
per acre more than doubled (40 bushels to over 100 bushels) from 1948
to the mid-1970*s. During this period, according to the USLE and other
evidence, billions of tons of soil erosion occurred. Of course, the
crucial question is what corn yields would be today if there had been less
erosion in the last 30 years. If we had good data we mtglit be able to
alter my coffee room quote from Paul Barkley who says that, "sotl con
servation just doesn't pay for farmers."
A second critical question is whether conservation tillage and no-til
really work; Is the reduction in erosion as great as the USLE says it
is? And is the chisel plowing that many farmers are doing really con
servation tillage? Farmers appear to be chisel plowing because it reduces
their costs but in many cases are leaving less residue on the surface than
necessary to qualify as conservation tillage. They appear to be substituting
chisel plowing for other conservation practices. They are aided and abetted
by economists,, agronomists, SCS technicians, etc., who use the,USLE and .
show substantial reductions in erosion. But is the real erosion consistent
with our calculations?
A related need is for more information on the yield responses to
no-til and conservation tillage. There is some good data for some crops
and soil types but more is needed. We probably need a combination of
plot data and good records of farmer experience with these practices.
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The management requirements of these practices, particularly on some soil
types, appear to be greater than with conventional tillage. If we are to
rely on reduced tillage for much of our erosion control, intensive extension
efforts may be needed.
We need to know more about movement of nutrients from land to surface
water and methods of control. The nutrient loss data I presented was edge
of field—really edge of plot because it was based on two acre fields. Very
little seems to be known about delivery ratios for nutrients, r am not
hopeful that our level of knowledge in this area will increase markedly
In the near future.
There is also a critical need for more quantification of the benefits
of improved water quality as a result of less sedtment_,nutrients, etc.
Relatively little work has been done in this area.
At the start of my presentation I suggested that perhaps we need a
mid-stream correction in our work on control of non-point sources of
pollution from agriculture. The bottom line of my comments is: Is the pro
gram we are about to embark upon—the 208 program and the cost-sharing
likely to accompany it—likely to lead to significant improvements in
water quality? Or should we admit that what we are doing is trying to
control erosion and hope that there will be some water quality benefits
to justify the costs that are not recouped by the benefits of erosion
control?
-IT-
TABLE 1: Effects of Selected SWCPs on -Average Annual Soil, Runoff, and Nutrient
Losses, Tama Silty Clay Loam, Iowa (estimated with Cornell Nutrient
Simulation Model). Continuous corn except for the Corn-Alfalfa 50-50
rotation.
Practice Soil
Loss
Runoff
Dissolved
Phosphorus
Runoff
Dissolved
Nitrogen
Runoff
Nitrogen
Leached
Nitrogen
Runoff +
Leached
Percentage Change kg/ha
Conventional-^ — — — — 75
Contour -55 -15 -20 -25 +10 76
Terrace -95 -30 -30 -30 +10 76
C-A Rotation -60 -55 -55 -75 -50 34
Conservation
Tillage 2/ -70 -30 -35 -30 +10 76
—''straight row, moldboard plow.
2/
—Chisel plow, lots of residue left on surface.
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Cost and Management: Practices and Policy Options
for the Annual Cropping Area of the Palouse
Edgar L. Michalson
I titled our paper: Cost and Management Practices and Policy Options
for the Annual Cropping Area of the Palouse. I would like to report on
two studies that we have done in this area to take a look at the ques
tion of what's the cost of implementing some of the best management prac
tices that have been recommended for this area. For those who don't
know, that's where you are. The red on the slide area here corresponds
to a soil association called the Palouse Thatuna-Naff Soil Association
which is one of the major soils associations in this area. In 1975 we
started a study looking at that soil association In both Whitman and
Latah Counties. The history of this area basically is one of about a
hundred years of crop production. Soil erosion has been a major problem
in this area for that period. We have estimates made by V. Kiser who
worked to measure soil losses in Whitman County from the 1930's to the
present. He estimated that these soil losses on the average ranged any
where from about six tons per acre to over twenty tons per acre. When
you look at the area, the steepness of the topography runs as high as
over 50%.
We are In a twenty inch rainfall area In which we get 60% of Its rain
fall from the period beginning in November and ending In March. That of
course corresponds to our most serious erosion period when we get most
of our runoff, and also the problem referred to as rain falling on frozen
ground. We do not have good permeability during this time period. As
far as controlling the erosion Itself, the concern we are talking about is
non-structural practices for the most parts. There are some terraces put
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in but terraces are not accepted very well fay fanners in this area. We
are trying to get some changes in looking at this area in terms of
structural practices. As a general rule v/e can conclude that farmers
have not accepted the structural practice very well.
On top of this add the effects of technology in terms of increasing
horse power for tractors which gives us the ability to plow right
straight up over the top of the hill. That, obviously, accelerated the
soil erosion problem for those managers who prefer to farm that way.
In the last 30 years pesticides and fertilizers have created a masking
effect in terms of productivity. Productivity has tended to increase and
is pretty stable at the present time. Its increase is the result of
using fertilizer, pesticides and the addition of new varieties In this
area.
We are trying to set up some criteria for looking at the economics of
trying to control this kind of erosion. The goals of the study that
we started out with were attempt to evaluate the opportunity costs of
controlling soil erosion in this area. We have used the modified univer
sal soil loss equation which has been modified by Don McCool who is an
SEA-AR Agricultural Engineer located at Washington State University.
We have surveyed farms in Latah and Whitman Counties, developed linear
programming models, and evaluated the alternatives in the first study
I am reporting on to evaluate what could be done in tenns of changing
crop rotations and using minimum tillage to try to reduce soil erosion.
Acceptable levels are arbitrarily defined. In this study, which was
done by John t41chael Harker"'it was possible to reduce soil loss to four
^John Michael Harker. "Soil Conservation and Farm Management^
Planning: ADescriptive Economic Model." Unpublished master thesis.
Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Idaho.
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tons per acre. This soil loss reduction resulted from going to a more
extensive cropping system. These include the benefits that you get from
reduced tillage. In addition, we estimated that one looses at least one
and a half bushels of winter wheat per acre by going to minimum tillage.
We also have a benefit for minimum tillage in the sense that we are not
spending as much money to till the ground. The opportunity costs of con
trolling erosion starts out very small, 19 cents an acre. The cost of
reducing soil loss to 4 tons per acre was $30/acre. On a 1100 acre farm
that means that in terms of the profit margins we have lost about $30,000
worth of profit.
Now, the second study I want to refer to was related to a program in
the Latah County Soil and V/ater Conservation District and a series of best
management practices which the district defined. These five points are:
1) restricted summer fallow, 2) minimum tillage, 3) contour tillage,
4) divided slopes, and 5) seeding in critical areas. We have the same
kind of system. We're using the modified universal soil loss equation to
make our soil loss estimates. We are looking at the same rotations essen
tially and we are applying these best management practices. The one
difference we need to look at is the seeding critical areas.
The average basin farm is 1400 acres. It has the winter wheat rota
tion with peas and we are talking about the total cost of applying the
five point program with 10^ of the land being retired into some kind of
permanent cover in the areas that are critical. Cost is about $15,700.
That's in terms of opportunity cost, or in terms of profit reduction.
Works out to $11.21 per acre. We are doing that and we are reducing our
2
Steve Howard Berglund. "Economic Evaluation of the Five Point Soil
Erosion Control Program in Latah Co. Idaho." Unpublished masters thesis.
Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Idaho.
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soil loss to approximately two and a half tons per acre by the use of
this five point program. Over here what v/e did was that we said that 10%
is too much, we can do the job by really seeding out only 2 1/2 percent
of the acres on this farm which amounts to 35 acres in this case and it
was 140 originally. The other 7 1/2 percent we can seed to annual bar
ley and improve profit a little bit. We came up with a cost figure here
of about $9.35 per acre. Now these cost figures that we are looking at
are basically short run analyses. There are some basis for looking at a
cost sharing arrangement for this area. We also made some estimates for
this area that v/e are talking about which happens to be Cow Creek.
It was estimated that the net income for the area without any soil
erosion control was about 2.2 million dollars. If we seeded up to 10 per
cent of the critical areas, income dropped to a point where we lost about
$200,000 income to the farmers in that area. If we seeded 2 1/2 percent
to permanent cover, we dropped down to about $167,000 worth of net income
to the farmers in that area. The loss of farm incomes is a policy variable
we should be looking at in the sense that there are implications for the
local communities. Obviously they will be interested In what we do in
terms of setting up pollution control cost sharing arrangements, regula
tions, taxes, or whatever we might have.
Note that these are short run analyses. Secondly that we are not talk
ing about benefits that may be acruing to the farm because of the fact
that soil is being saved. There are long term benefits but that gets into
the question of what discount rate is going to be used to evaluate these
benefits. Finally, we may have a basis here for looking at cost sharing
arrangements.
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The five point program does clearly indicate that if we can rely
on the modified universal soil loss equation, we can do a better job
of controlling soil erosion with this program than we can do by just'
manipulating the crop rotations-and relying on minimum tillage to do
that.
-18-
Policy Options and Best Management Practices
for Improving Water Quality
and Reducing Soil Loss in Agriculture
David J. Walker
Best management practices, BMPVs for effectively reducing agricul
tural soil loss and sedimentation of surface waters are known. Several
have been described in other papers in this section. The technology is
available but the problem is how to encourage farmers to adopt best man
agement practices. The problem arises because society at large gains much
of the benefit from enhanced water quality: iji^iroved water recreation
opportunities, reduced e^qjenditure for ditch and culArert maintenance along
roads, increased life of reservoirs. The farmer, however, pays much o£
the cost both direct and indirect, of erosion and sediment control. Even
though the farmer may receive cost-sharing subsidies, he still bears part ,
of the cost for constructing and maintaining terraces, sediment ponds and
other structures. He may also face increased operating costs with some
KMP*s, and possibly reduced yields. All potentially act to reduce net
fam income and discourage farmers from Mipleraenting BMP*s.
For successful control of erosion and improved water quality as man
dated by the Resource Conservation Act and the Rural Clean Water Act,
policies for encouraging the adoption of EMP's are required. In the past
there has been a traditional reliance on cost share programs or subsidies
and on technical assistance. While progress has been made in reducing
erosion, the USDA recently estimated that average annual soil loss from
faimland is 9 tons per acre, approxiinately twice the tolerable rate sug
gested by the Soil Conservation Service. Astudy conducted in Iowa
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attcmpted to simulate aiid evaluate tJie impact of alternative public pol
icies on K^IP adoption, net fann income, water quality, and soil loss in
a river basin. Tlie policies analyzed included subsidies, regulations and
soil loss tax. The E^IP's evaluated were contouring, niinijnum tillage
defer plowing until spring to maintain surface crop residue, terracing,
and change in crop laix. Hie analysis was conducted with a linear program
ming model of a river basin in Iowa. The model incorporated three price
scenarios to increase tJie generality of the results: high crop prices
relative to input costs, low crop prices and average or trend crop prices.
Tiie l.S million acre Kisiinabotna River Basin in Southwest Iowa has typical
slopes of 2-0 to 141. Fall plowing is comon for row crops to facilitate
planting in the spring, but contributes to high erosion rates. The pre
dominant crops in the area are com and soybeans with average annual soil
loss of 20 tons per acre. Hiis base level soil loss contributed 9650 mg/
liter of sediment to surface waters with a delivery ratio of .25.
Table 1 shows the policies wliich were analyzed including the base
run or "do nothing" policy option which provided a baseline against which
the other policies could be coirpared. Various combinations of these pol
icies were considered, some of \vhich proved to be redundant. Policies
for encouraging the iraplementation o:frBMP's in the river basin can be
classified into t\vo groups according to effectiveness.
—^The term "minimum tillage" refers to the reduced tillage system
known as strip-till planting of till planting. Planting occurs in the
spring employing a 10-inch wide surface sweep to remove residue and a 2
to 3 incli layer of top soil directly over the row where seed is planted
in the same operation. Depending on tlie row width, bet^-zeen 66 and 80
percent of tJie field surface remains covered with crop residue.
-20-
TABtE 1: POLICY ANALYSIS - NONPOINT POLLUTIOI
1, Base Run
2- Ban on fall moldboard plowing
3. Ban against straight row cultivation on slopes over 21
4. Soil loss limit of 5 tons per acre
5. Soil loss tax
6. Subsidy for contouring
7. Subsidy for minijnum tillage
8. Subsidy for terracing
9. Combined subsidies for terracing and minimum tillage
-21-
Public policies, capable of reducing average soil loss and sedimenta
tion by approximately 50% to the neighborhood of 10 tons/acre and 4760
mg/liter are shown in Table 2. A ban on fall plowing, soil loss tax of
10^ to 20^ per ton and a subsidy for minimum tillage achieved the 50%
reduction with decreases in net farm income between 2.2% and 3% for the
regulatory and tax policies. The income penalty associated with the tax
policies depends on the price scenario and includes the loss in net income
from changing production methods as well as the cost of the tax. The BMP
responsible for this level of improved water quality was the adoption of
minimum tillage on some or all of the land classes.
Further reductions in soil loss and sedimentation by 90% to the
neighborhood of 2 tons per acre and 900 mg/liter were achieved with another
group of policies listed in Table 3. One of the regulatory policies that
achieved this level of control was a dual ban, combining a ban against fall
plowing mth a baii against straight row ploid.ng on slopes over 2%. The
dual ban entailed an income penalty between 5.5% and 9.5% of net fam income
depending on the price scenario. A soil loss limit of 5 tons, the other
regulatory policy in this group, achieved almost the same reduction in soil
loss as the dual ban and imposed a slightly larger income penalty, ranging
from 6.8% to 13.5% decline in net farm income. A tax on soil loss was among
the policies which attained the 90% reduction standard. A tax of 50 cents
to $1.50 per ton of soil loss, depending on price scenario, achieved the
desired improvement in water quality and resulted in net income penalties
ranging from 11.0% to 7.1%, Titfo subsidy policies were effective in re
ducing soil loss and sedimentation by approximately 90%. A terrace
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subsidy—^ of $16.60 per acre reduced average soil loss to 2.6 tons per
acre and sedimentation to 1050 mg/liter, just short of the 90^ standard.
Acombined subsidy —^ of $2.90 per acre for min-till and $15.40 per acre
for terracing resulted in average soil loss of 1,9 tons per acre. The
BNIP^s which facilitated this improvement in water quality to the 90% level
were the adoption of minimum tillage on most lands and/or terracing on
the steepest lands combined with the introduction of meadow into the crop
rotation in some cases.
The Iowa study indicated that soil loss and agricultural sedimenta
tion of surface waters could be reduced in the study area as much as 90§
with modest income penalties of less than 14%. The achievement of this
standard, may be realized with regulatory policies, subsidies, or tax
policies.
The Iowa study also revealed something interesting about the inter
action between conservation and environmental goals with respect to policy
options. The result is the converse of a point made by George Casler in
an earlier paper where he mentioned that in pursuing the conservation
goal by reducing soil loss, we may not simultaneously realize environmental
goals, notably water quality. Insoluble agricultural residues that are
carried to surface waters adsorbed to soil particles in runoff can be con
trolled with the same policies that succeed in controlling soil erosion.
2/—'Terrace subsidies of $15.20 per acre and $19.30 per acre were
required in the low price and high price scenarios, respectively.
3/—'The combined subsidies were $1.70 and $14.20 in the low price
scenario and $4.90 and $17.50 in the high price scenario.
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However, contamination from soluble nutrients in agricultural runoff may
be worsened by some erosion control practices such as conserv^ation tillage
and associated fertilization practices. The converse point indicated by
the Iowa study is that the environmental goal may be pursued without
achieving the conservation goal on all land classes. Some policies, in
otherwords, may result in practices which meet water quality standards,
but still produce excessive soil loss on some lands.
The soil loss tax appears to be such a policy. During the simulation,
the tax iirqproved water quality in the river basin by reducing average soil
loss in the basin but still allotted soil loss on some land classes in
excess of tolerable levels established by the Soil Conservation Service.
A soil loss tax discourages those activities where the soil loss per dol
lar of income earned is high. In this manner production might be modified
on the marginally productive steeper slopes where soil loss is high thus
reducing average soil loss in a river basin and sedimentation in surface
waters. However, a tax might not prevent the extensive cultivation of the
more productive, moderately steep lands. Cropping decisions on these
lands might allow soil loss to exceed recommended limits because the high
crop yields and lower soil loss coefficients result in low ratios of soil
loss per dollar of income produced. These moderately steep lands may not
be protected against erosion by a soil loss tax even though the standards
for water quality in the river basin may be attained. As alternatives,
the 5-ton soil loss limit and dual ban against fall plowing and straight-
row plowing offer more certain erosion protection on all land classes as
well as providing comparable levels of sediment control.
These results indicate that we need to be mindful of both objectives
-26-
in fomtulating policy. Correct policies can encourage practices which
will result in the simultaneous achievement of both goals, however, the
policy maker inust be cognizant of the income penalties associated with
those policies. Finally, regulatory and tax policies may be equally as
effective as subsidies in achieving significant reduction in soil loss
and improvement in water quality thus expanding the range of options for
consideration by policy makers.
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ISSUES IN THE SELECTION OF APPROPRIATE POLICY INSTRUMENTS
TO CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION"
John A. Mlranowski and Klaus T*. Alt
Introduction
We need to find answers to some thorny policy-issues pertaining to the
choice of policy instruments to control nonpoint source residuals from agri
cultural production activities. First, what are the criteria for deciding
the appropriate policy instruments for controlling nonpoint pollution?
Second, how do policy costs influence the choice of-policy instruments and
the level of pollution control?
In an attempt to highlight these issues, we will draw on the economic
theory behind the decisions as well as on the existing empirical studies
relating to these issues. Hopefully, in this process we will be able to
identify the unanswered, or incompletely answered, questions. With the
help of the audience, the significance of these issues can be identified.
One of our major concerns is that most of us have been busy fire—fighting
or developing answers to specific questions to which someone is demanding
an' immediate response. No one is taking the time to develop a comprehensive
overview of the situation nor to determine which are highest priority areas
of research.
Policy Instrument Selection Criteria
The two major economic criteria considered in policy analysis are
efficiency and equity. Other criteria such as socio-political acceptability,
could be included, but these criteria are generally a function of the effi
ciency and equity characteristics of policy instruments.
-28-
Efficiency
The points we want to highlight today are both indicated in a qtu>te
from Fisher and Peterson:
A number of control policies can be used for pollution.
And they are equally efficient, except where information about
costs and benefits is incomplete and where there are administra
tive costs involved—which is to say, except in the real world.
We face the "real world" with respect to nonpoint source pollution related
to agricultural production. Information is incomplete, policy (adminis
trative) costs may be significant, and all policy instruments are not
equally efficient. Thus we need to select politically feasible policies
that minimize policy costs and cost of error.
A number of potential policy instruments have been proposed to control
nonpoint source pollution: user charges, subsidies, marketable rights,
and direct regulations. The objective of each policy is to change the
decision parameters of the polluting farm firms so that they lower their
residuals entering the environment. The structure of each policy varies
and so does the appropriateness of a specific policy in a given situation.
Generally, the literature treats user charges, subsidies, and market
able rights as being equally efficient alternatives and more efficient than
Titf>st direct regulation approaches. How then does one choose among the
efficient options? In the absence of perfect information on the optimal
level of pollution abatement, one criteria is to minimize the social cost
of an error in the level of abatement. We can minimize the cost of an
error if we know the elasticity of the abatement supply curve (Alt and
Miranowski).
Figure 1 illustrates the case where we establish the level of abate-
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raent (either via marketable rights or direct regulation) in the absence
of perfect knowledge. In the elastic supply function case, the social
cost of requiring abatement at level b when level a is the optimum is
the lined area a. In the inelastic case the lined and hashed areas (a
and 3) are incurred as social costs of level b when a is the optimum
level. The social cost of an error is greater in the inelastic case.
The alternative .case is presented in Figure 2 for the policy instrument
in which we set the tax/user charge or subsidy/bribe. For these policy
options the social cost of an error is greater for an elastic abatement supply
curve (represented by the vertically lined area a) than for an inelastic
supply situation (represented by the vertically lined area 3).
Of course, any abatement cost function is likely to have both elastic
and inelastic ranges. The choice of policy may change if the demand for
abatement increases or decreases sufficiently to shift the desired level of
abatement from the elastic to the inelastic segment of the abatement supply
curve or vice versa. Figure 3, taken from Taylor and Frohberg, illustrates
the nature of abatement supply curves for alternative policy instruments in
controlling soil loss in agriculture. At lower levels of control, the
abatement supply curve is elastic but at higher levels of control the curve
-30-
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Figure 1. Cost of error in permit program for alternative
abatement supply functions
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becomes quite inelastic. Thus, at less restrictive levels of pollution
control, the social cost of error is minimized by selecting a policy that
prescribes the desired level of abatement. As abatement demand increases
sufficiently, then policy instruments relying on a price incentive scheme
will minimize the social cost of erring in selecting the optimal level of
pollution abatement.
We stated above that the policy costs of particular policy instruments
should be included in the abatement supply function. These policy costs
also may alter the elasticity over particular segments of the abatement
supply function and the choice of policy instrument.
Generally, three types of policy costs are incurred when attempting
to establish the optimum level of pollution abatement. First, information
costs are incurred in acquiring data and making the determination of the
socially desirable level of pollution abatement. These information costs
are assumed the same for all policy options and levels of control. Second,
administrative costs are incurred in running the pollution control agency
and monitoring polluting activities. Third, ensuring compliance generates
enforcement costs for the pollution control agency. As the required level
of abatement is increased, the incentive to avoid compliance will increase
and so will policing and judicial costs.
Alternative policy instruments will have differential impacts on policy
costs. The most efficient policy approach may not be theoretically determi-
nable when policy costs are included in the analysis and we may have to rely
on empirical investigations to determine relative efficiency.
Figure 4 may be used to illustrate the potential impacts of policy
costs on the optimal level of abatement. Equating the marginal abatement
-33-
costs and the marginal benefits of abatement yields a, the optimal level
of abatement. Marginal policy costs can be added to the toarginal abate
ment costs in Figure 4 to derive the marginal social costs of abatement.
The inclusion of policy costs reduces the optimal level of abatement
activity for society from a to b. Thus, ignoring policy costs in pollution
control may lead to excessive abatement and a misaiiocation of resources.
Seitz, et al., provides point estimates of policy costs for a given
level of nonpoint pollution control for alternative policy instruments.
Policy costs range from $163,000 per county for an educational option to
$981,000 per county for a fifty percent cost sharing program. It is
reasonable to expect that most nonpoint source policy options will fall
into this policy cost range as long as the level of abatement desired is
not extremely large or small. It is obvious that these policy costs are
not insignificant.
Even if policy costs are substantial, do these costs make a signif
icant contribution to total social costs? Unfortunately, we do not have'
cost functions from which to derive actual marginal cost estimates, but
instead, only point estimates of the total costs. Combining the estimates
of Taylor and Frohberg with the estimates of Seitz, et'al., provides an
indication of the relative magnitude of these policy costs on a per county
basis. Assuming a moderate level of control and depending upon the, policy
option employed, total policy costs may add from 25 to over 200 percent to
the social cost of abating soil erosion. Another model by Alt and Heady
for a subbasin of the Iowa-Cedar River estimates the increased farm production
costs associated with alternative methods of erosion control. The policy
cost approximations of Seitz, et al. would add from 20 to 125 percent to
-34-
the increased production cost estimates for an average county.
The impacts of policy costs in determining abatement levels and
policy instrument choices can only be determined by empirical investiga
tion. To calculate these policy costs, we need to begin with estimates
at the farm level and scale-up these costs to the watershed, state, and
national levels. Although the specific data are not currently available,
plans are currently underway to collect such data for an area in Iowa.
Since policy costs may have a significant impact on the direction of
Section 208 planning efforts, we consider these data a priority item.
Previously, we mentioned information costs incurred in determining
the costs and benefits of abatement and the optimal level of abatement.
Outside of the studies by Swanson and colleagues in Illinois, few efforts
have been made to calculate the off-site social benefits of abatement.
Also, our approach to research on the costs of abatement is symptomatic
of the current state of the art. EPA and society are concerned with water
quality and the benefits of water quality improvements, but most of our
research and modeling efforts have concentrated on gross soil loss and
its control. Until we firmly establish the links between water quality
goals and the agricultural sector impacts, it is Impossible to establish
optimal levels of control because we know neither the costs nor the
benefits. Some of our greatest inefficiencies may derive from too much
or too little nonpoint source control in the future.
Equity
The equity issues associated with nonpoint pollution control are
numerous. Only a few will be mentioned in passing. Casler and Jacobs,
and Taylor and Frohberg have estimated the Impacts on farmers versus
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sociecy of various policy inst v'uinents. A user charge has the most severe
impact on farmers. Boggess, et al., have used a representative farm
model to assess the implication of BMP's for farmers in different financial
situations and with different enterprise combinations. We still lack
comparative analyses within the farm sector. What are the impacts on
small versus large farmers? What are the impacts on owners versus tenants?
l^hat are the impacts on farmers in one region or state versus another
region or state? These factors and others will definitely influence the
acceptability of alternative policy instruments at the farm level.
Conclusions
We have raised a few issues that we feel are important in selecting
nonpoint source pollution control policy instruments for agriculture.
Awareness of policy costs, error costs» and social cost of inefficiency
all interact and must be dealt with simultaneously.
A number of equity questions remain unanswered, or inadequately
answered, and the issues will influence the acceptability of policy
instruments.
In the discussion that follows, we are anxious to hear your evaluation
of the significance of the issues raised as well as those inadvertently
omitted.
-36-
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Some Thoughts on the Political Economics of
Water Quality Improvement
by
Lawrence W. Libby*
My purpose here is to focus on the policy structure for implementing water
quality programs affecting agriculture. My contention is that institutional
structure does make a difference both in terms of policy output and distribu
tion of implementation cost. While I can't be precise as to what difference
it makes, I can suggest important structural issues. I will mention institu
tional techniques for water quality improvement, but will concentrate on
organization.
First, let me offer a few observations on the role of the applied economist
in the implementation of water quality policy, expanding on what has been
said by other panelists. A fundamental role for economics as a discipline,
and those who practice it, is the organization and measurement of the impli
cations of alternative institutional arrangements for getting the job dpne.
Allocation of discretion among the key actors --landowners and managers,
levels, of governmenti and even agencies within a level of government — can
affect performance and overall cost. In reducing non-point pollution, we
are basically talking about changing the behavior of the land user. We
have several v/ays to do that, a whole list of ingenious bribes, threats
and appeals for enlightened self-interest. - Each set of instruments implies
a certain transaction cost -- the cost of doing business. That category of
cost can vary with who is directing the policy instrument, as well as choice
of the instrument itself. For example, assume we decide that limited water
* Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State
University. On leave during 1978-79, Office of Environmental Quality, Office
of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC. Remarks
prepared for AAEA Symposium, Pullman, Washington, 1979.
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quality regulations are appropriate. Regulations must be enforced. Costs
will vary depending on who calls the polluter to account for his poor citi
zenship. It may be done by a sort of enforcement conference, where the
offender is called before a selected group of local peers, confronted with
evidence of his misdeed, and asked if maybe he couldn't do better in the
interest of community solidarity or something. Alternatively, States could
enforce directly. Several have enacted rigorous sediment controls. There
is even precedent for enforcement at the Federal level. My point is not
that we should or will have regulations, but that economics of water quality
improvement includes measurement of cost differences among alternative insti
tutional structures. We have a role to help produce implementation decisions
based on improved knowledge of consequences.
I will turn now to discussion of several issues pertaining to institutional
structure:
Levels of Government. All levels of government. Federal, State and local,
must recognize their strengths and limitations in dealing with water pollu
tion. Some interests seem to wish the Federal level away, while others
see no hope for local implementation. The fact is that neither can do it
alone. Clearly the Federal Government has a role in improving water quality.
Direction comes from legislation and other indicators of popular support for
nationwide improvement. The public sees significant off-site benefit from
clean water. But the Feds can't do everything, despite what some may think.
States have taken significant leadership In both sediment control and water
quality regulation. They have the geographic scope and experience in selected
regulation. Local governments retain authority for traditional land use
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regulation. These roles are not inviolate, but there is momentum of support
built on years of practice. And political support is the crucial variable
holding the line on the cost of conducting water quality programs. Adjust
ments in allocation of discretion among levels of government must acknowledge
significant strengths of these levels established overtime. To assume
that only through drastic reordering of roles can water quality improvement
be accomplished would be a costly mistake.
National Level. At the national level, both the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have important
responsibilities for implementing water quality policy. Each has its con
stituency. USDA obviously has a history of contact with agriculturists,
whose behaviour is so crucial to any reduction in non-point pollution.
To hazard a few generalizations, the tendency in USDA is to prefer policy
instruments that provide economic incentives for the farm manager to nudge
his behavior in socially desirable directions. This tendency is based on
first-hand knowledge of what it takes to run a farm business, and how
individual enterprises relate to overall national production. Various
agricultural interest groups are prepared to remind the agency of these
facts if they should forget. The tradition in EPA, on the other hand, is
more regulatory. Their tendency is impatience, based on pressure from
various environmental groups. EPA has had primary responsibility for
implementing environmental legislation, including 208 planning which
presumably provides the basis for water quality improvement. The USDA role
was fairly peripheral at this planning stage, with exceptions in some States.
Agriculture has a more direct role in implementation through the Rural Clean
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WaterProgram. Despite their historic differences, both agencies need each
other in this effort. ' EPA must succeed in measurably improving water quality,
aiming -at the somewhat dubious target of fishable and swimmable water by 1985.
USDA must succeed also in this effort, but not at the expense of major loss
of agricultural support. It is an uneasy marriage that must work.
Agencies in USDA. As an economist, I am a firm believer in the virtue of
competition. It sharpens efficiency, removes excess profit. That holds
for government as well. Competition among agencies is basically healthy,"
and we in USDA are in robust health. Total consensus on things would be
a real bore. Bureaucratic competition is somewhat different from its parent
in the market place, however. Some of the corrective devices don't seem
operable.' Firms that are either less efficient or producing the wrong
product seldom go out of business. Perhaps reorganization is the public
equivalent. What we usually see is bureaucratic oligopoly.
The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) and the^Soil
Conservation Service (SCS) are the primary competitors in the water quality
area. The former has been the source of various commodity and conservation
payments over the years, operating through farmer committees at the county
level. The latter provides technical assistance for installation of those
conservation practices, and operates through the semi-autonomous county
conservation districts. Putting aside all the historical complexities of
this case, we have something of a leadership crisis for the effort to reduce
agricultural pollution. Representative Tom Foley of Washington put it
succinctly at the last annual meeting of the National Association of Conserva
tion Districts, "Internal dispute at the Department over the administration
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of key soil programs must be resolved, or they will spill over into the
Congressional arena and weaken conservation programs now under review."
While made several months ago, the remark is still valid. Secretary Bergland
assigned leadership to SCS, but ASCS has its own support base on Capitol Hill,
A recent article in a Des Moines, Iowa, paper indicated that Congressman
Jam=he Whitten, Chairman of the House Agricultural Appropriations Subcommittee,
steadfastly intends to give the money and control to ASCS. Both SCS and ASCS
have leadership for largely separate water quality implementation experiments.
The Model Implementation Program led by SCS for the Department, has seven
implementation experiments underway throughout the country. There is moni
toring and evaluation over the three years of the experiment. ASCS is
supplying special cost-sharing assistance for the MIPS and participates in
the overall effort. But ASCS has 21 special water quality projects of its
own, created through its normal authority and responsibility to target cost
sharing funds on problems deemed to have social import. Water pollution is
one of those. There is no evaluation or monitoring with this latter effort,
however. It is more clearly an action program. Some have claimed that the
ASCS selection process skimmed off the most promising rural clean water
projects, thus taking a larger share of the spotlight on water quality
improvement. ASCS allocates about $1.4 million per year to cost-sharing
for MIPS, and $4.3 million for the 21 special projects. What we really
have, then, is 28 areas where Federal agencies will be focusing programs
to reduce non-point pollution by reducing sediment loss and other farm
related problems. These really afford an opportunity to test various
implementation strategies. They could be a real laboratory for economic
and physical research. But that will take some oversight.
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Overlap'of National Legislation. The-Rural Clean Water Program, a 1977
amendment to Section 208 of P.L. 92-500, is the basic law bringing water
quality efforts to bear on rural areas. In'this as in other cases, agencies
mobilize to implement legislation,"focusing on specific programs, assigning
responsibility, etc. But RCWPis not the only kid on the block, maybe not
even the biggest or'-the toughest.- The Soil'and Water Resource Conservation
Act of 1977 (RCA) is also in the'picture. Water quality has been defined
as one important policy output'of RCA. The same techniques and practices are
being considered to reduce sediment run-off and other forms of non-point
agricultural pollution." But largely a separate effort was mobilized under
RCA, with somewhat different actors. For example, EPA.is not an active
participant iii RCA. Another relavarit law is the Resources Planning Act
• (RPA) involving appraisal and management of forests to accomplish certain
policy objectives, including improved water quality. The Forest Service
.has been about the only actor in this effort".
The point here is that people have problems, of which water pollution is
one, and governments have laws and agencies. The two' don't necessarily
coincide. . Each law is well intentioned on its own, seeking comprehensive
ness and completeness. Agencies have the obligation, it seems to me, to
treat problems as problems with a coordinated effort, and not get pushed
f into separate boxes by the provisions of a particular law.
Voluntary Action. The RCWP emphasizes voluntary compliance as the approach
\ • 1 .
to reducing water pollution problems caused by agriculture. We can not
assume, in my opinion, that voluntary action by farmers responding to
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cost-sharing incentives is the only way to solve the problem. Some of the
State 208 planning efforts have identified other measures, including tax
incentives, regulation, and enforcement conferences to encourage behavior
change by farmers. The RCA process will also evaluate a range of policy
options designed to reduce soil erosion on farms. These must be taken
seriously, their costs and benefits compared to voluntary compliance. There
is a clear national stake in clean water and certainly in a viable agricul
ture, We don't want to destroy agriculture in search of clean water. We
must be sensitive to management incentives faced by farmer-businessmen.
But there are ways other than through strictly voluntary programs that any
unreasonable impacts on agriculture may be accounted for. It seems to me
that the policy mood of the country is one of awareness of resource limits,
caution on further exploitation of natural resources or environmental
despoliation, and particularly demand for some return for public dollars
spent. That is the clear message in soil and water conservation, and will
be further articulated in water quality. The right to own real property
is also valued, of course. We know, however, that rights are redefined
every day in court actions, legislation and other expressions of trade-off
between private right and public responsibility. Further, an increasing
proportion of the public gains access to land through public action, rather
than through fee simple ownership.
My plea is that policy options other than voluntarism be carefully analyzed,
including administrative cost, in accomplishing improved water quality in
rural areas. Full information is needed for wise choices. I suspect that
the American people may be out ahead of government agencies on this point.
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A special Harris poll, commissioned by the RCA Coordinating Committee in
Washington, will shed additional light on public preference as to how and
by v;hom soil and v/ater obo'ectives may be accomplished.
More on Human Behavior. Our ultimate goal in RCWP, RCA and all those other
legislative initials, is to 'improve water quality by changing the ways in
which people use resources. Since, in the non-point area we don't know who
really causes the problem,-we can't go after just a few individuals. The
important variable, then, is human action in the presence of various positive
and negative incentives. We are trying to anticipate how people v/ill react
to threats and bribes. Education and persuasion are obviously key components,
Education can be extremely valuable to help the key land users accurately
understand the current policy environment, of which water quality is just
a part. People need the confidence and information to make choices. People
will resist being pushed into doing things for which they see no valid
reason or which they perceive as contrary to their best interest. But the
real choices facing land managers differ from year to year. Farmers simply
can't do everything with their land that they could a decade ago. Educators
must help them keep pace. In my judgement. Extension has been an under
utilized resource in the whole water quality exercise thus far.
Persuasion is different from policy education, but no less important. Per
haps land managers can be persuaded to use their land in socially desirable
ways by granting special recognition to those who do so.
Conclusions. We are moving into the implementation phase of efforts to
improve water quality. We are clearly operating with far less data than
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we need - others have pointed that out. In addition to data on water
quality performance of various practices, we need information on overall
economic performance of institutional approaches to solving the problems.
It does little good to map out a detailed research agenda and agree that
we know too little now to do anything. The policy process won't wait for
that. Decisions will be made, programs established. People will react,
additional data collected, studies done for the next iteration. We are
forever stuck with a "muddling through" policy model, characterized by
limited comparison of options in terms of who is affected"how, I happen
to think that resource economists are better equipped than most other
people to participate in that process.
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• DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTS
The audience participated throughout the symposium with penetrating
questions and comments. Some of the points raised by the participants
were:
1) Rather than focusing attention only on the optimum level of
soil erosion, there should be more discussion of the concept of an
optimum rate of soil erosion, based upon conjunctive management of
productivity and water quality. It was noted that Earl Swanson at the
University of Illinois has looked at the optimal rate of depletion of
soil resources. Questions were raised about whether attention should
be focused on an acceptable national erosion rate or on the rates in
critical production areas such as the Mid-west, the Palouse, and
western Tennessee. There are perhaps some regions where society cannot
afford large soil losses'whereas losses in other regions are.not so
significant, at least in terms of productivity maintenance.
2) There is a distinction between the acceptable levels of erosion
for the maintenance of soil productivity (the "t" value) and that needed,
to meet water quality goals. This distinction arises in discussion
between USDA and EPA. USDA asks how much conservation can farmers
afford for productivity purposes whereas EPA asks how much sediment and
chemical control can they afford.
3) The role of and future of cross-compliance between price support
programs and water quality programs was discussed. The cross-compliance
idea is being studied under the Resource Conservation Act (RCA) but
there has been little basic research. The ASCS leadership recognizes
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the relationship between commodity programs and conservation goals, and
further research is anticipated.
4) The need for research on the effectiveness of alternative
xnstltutional arrangements was emphasized. Little Is known about the
difference between cross-compliance arrangements and other types of
institutional models. Little is presently being done to evaluate the
information develop&d In the Model Implementation Projects. Consequently,
there is no objective basis for measuring institutional performance in
meeting stated goals.
5) There are some external benefits to soil erosion that are
often overlooked, such as the creation of the Mississippi River Delta
and the fertilization of oyster beds in Apalachlcola Bay in Florida
due to sediment from Georgia.
6) There are instances where the external costs of sedimentation
in water are much less than the cost of keeping it on the land. For
example, on streams used for drinking water but not for recreation, It
may be much cheaper to treat the drinking water than to hold the soil
in the fields, independent of the soil productivity issue.
7) Some concern was expressed about the private economics of the
soil loss control decision. With any "reasonable" private discount rate,
conservation may be difficult to justify. Philosophically, some
participants might like to see a zero social discount rate in this
context.
8) The role of risk preferences and perceptions may be critical
in farmers' willingness to adopt and utilize soil conserving practices.
Assuming risk neutrality and perfect information in our policy modeling
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efforts may provide quite misleading results.
* 9) The attitudes of some agencies responsible for soil conserva-
5
- tion and for coordination of soil loss control policies may be hampering
progress. The ASCS's approach was causing some consternation.
10) The relationship between soil loss and water quality is not
well established. Thus reservations were expressed concerning how
well researchers could tie back soil loss control to what EPA has
established for water quality goals. From the water quality
perspective our concern should be with controlling sediment as opposed
to er9sion. Similar concerns were expressed over the policy options
considered by researchers relative to the politically feasible set.
11) The impact of rising energy prices on soil erosion and on the
effectiveness of soil loss control policies was mentioned as a relevant
area for future research.
12) The cost-effectiveness of alternative BMPs may vary significantly
depending on the location and the level of control desired. If a subsidy
approach is used to achieve future conservation goals, this cost-effective
ness information should be incorporated into subsidy-level decisions for
specific practices.
